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The Clash of Commitments at the International
Criminal Court
Tom Ginsburg*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 10, 2008, International Criminal Court ("ICC") Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo informed members of the UN Security Council that he would
be issuing an indictment against Sudanese President Omar Hassan al Bashir on
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity for events in Darfur.1 The
indictment, issued July 14, brought into stark relief the consequentialist debate
over international criminal justice. Opponents of impunity celebrated the
possibility that the international community might at last be willing to take
concrete steps toward ending the Darfur genocide. On the other hand, aid
groups on the ground feared retaliation and expulsion, and diplomats argued
that the indictments would make a peace deal in Darfur more difficult to
achieve.2 These varying responses echoed larger concerns over the ICC and the
international criminal law enterprise more broadly.
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Daniel Abebe, John Hagan,
Eric Posner and Brad Roth for comments and helpful discussions, and to Emily Winston for
excellent research assistance.
I Lydia Polgreen and Marlise Simons, The Pursuit of Jusice vs. the Pursuit of Peace, NY Times A7 (july
11, 2008). The indictment had been issued in response to a referral from the UN Security Council
under Security Council Res No 1593, UN Doc S/RES/1593 (2005). Prior to its request for an
arrest warrant for Bashir, the Office of the Prosecutor indicted two other individuals in
connection with its Resolution 1593 investigation. On February 27, 2007, the prosecutor initiated
a case against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The
Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for both these individuals on April 27, 2007. The
warrants are yet to be executed by the government of Sudan, although as of this writing Kushayb
has been arrested under Sudanese domestic law. Ahmad Harun maintains his post as Minister of
State for Humanitarian Affairs. Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial
Chamber 1: Public Summary of Prosecutor's Application under Article 58 (July 14, 2008), available online
at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-152-ENG.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
2 Polgreen and Simons, The Pursuit ofJusice, NY Times A7 (cited in note 1).
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This Article examines the problem of international criminal justice as a
problem of competing efforts to make credible commitments. States, it has been
argued, want to make their promises to deter mass atrocity credible and so join
the international court to ensure that this outcome will be obtained. The ICC
itself has a legal and political imperative to make its promises of prosecution
credible, or risk irrelevance. These efforts point in the direction of a functionalist
need for international criminal prosecutions. On the other hand, states and the
international community may sometimes need to make another type of credible
promise, namely a promise not to prosecute or to grant an amnesty. The ICC
seeks to make such promises impossible. The tension between these
commitment strategies means that conflict at some point is inevitable. I call this
the clash of commitments. The decision to indict Bashir brings the clash of
commitments to a head.
The clash of commitments provides a challenge and an opportunity to the
ICC. Ocampo's decision to indict a sitting head of state of a party to the Rome
Statute is a high-risk one. If it succeeds, it will do much to highlight the
successful institutionalization of the ICC as an independent player on the
international scene. If it fails, it will relegate the enterprise to the marginal
position in which it now sits: politically subservient to powerful state interests.
Which outcome is more likely cannot yet be predicted with confidence. But the
dynamics are already quite clear.
The final section of the Article reflects on this strategy of institutional
development for a young court, analogizing to domestic and international
predecessors. International judges, like domestic judges, must take institutional
factors into account when making decisions. Given the scarcity of enforcement
at the international level, the ICC judges need to establish a reputation of
producing decisions that generate compliance. The clash of commitments
provides a challenge and an opportunity to the international judges that run the
ICC-their institution may be immeasurably strengthened or harmed by the
outcome of this case. The Article concludes that the high-risk strategy of the
prosecutor is a novel one that is likely, but not guaranteed, to fail.
The Article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the ICC and the
debate over its efficacy. Section III briefly describes the Bashir Indictment.
Section IV presents what I have called the clash of commitments. Section V
shows that, though one can imagine that such high-profile cases have the
potential to solidify the reputation of a young court like the ICC, the conditions
for such a result are unlikely in the context of international criminal law. Section
VI concludes.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE DEBATE
OVER EFFICACY
The ICC surely must hold the record among international tribunals for the
highest ratio of scholarly literature to output.' Widely anticipated, and adopted
with great fanfare at the Rome Conference in 1998, the ICC has issued a total of
twelve arrests involving four different African conflicts since it came into being
in 2002.4 To date it has heard cases related to two situations, one involving the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other the Central African Republic.'
The ICC's jurisdiction is subject to the regime of complementarity described
in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, under which the ICC must find a case
inadmissible if it is being prosecuted by competent national authorities.6 The
complementarity regime virtually assures that the ICC will not hear cases against
major international military actors such as the US. Because a state can avoid
prosecution of its nationals by initiating a credible investigation or prosecution,
the only states likely to have their nationals prosecuted are those that either (1)
want the prosecution to go forward (say because of a domestic regime change)
and wish the international community to bear the costs of prosecution; or (2)
have too little state capacity to initiate a credible prosecution or investigation.
Sudan forms a potential third category: a recalcitrant state that wishes to avoid
prosecution. It remains to be seen whether prosecution can be effectively
obtained in this case.
The vast scholarly commentary on the ICC has generally been positive, with
scholars arguing that it fulfills the promise of ending impunity for the most
serious international crimes, deters further wrongdoing, and reduces conflict.'
Some celebrate the ex post punishment of mass atrocities as allowing the
international community to fulfill both its duty to protect and the post-
Nuremberg promise of ending genocide.8 Other scholars have been more
3 A Wesdaw search shows that 497 law review articles mention "International Criminal Court" in
the tide, as well as many books (last checked Dec 5, 2008).
4 International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, available online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/
cases.html> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
5 Two other situations, involving Uganda and Darfur, have led to indictments but no transfers of
suspects to the Hague. Id.
6 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), art 17(a), UN Doc No A/CONF.183/9,
reprinted in 37 ILM 999 (1998) ("Rome Statute").
7 See, for example, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Transnad 2003);
Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court (Oxford 2003); William A.
Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge 2001).
8 Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in Rome, Spring in the Hague, Winter in Washington? U.S. Poligy towards the
International Criminal Court, 21 Wisc Intl L J 557, 594-95 (2003).
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skeptical, noting that the type of defendants sought by the court are unlikely to
be deterred because they are irrational;9 that selective punishment is unlikely to
have much of a deterrent effect;' and that amnesties are sometimes necessary.
One trenchant line of critique is that the international criminal law enterprise
might in fact make things worse. When faced with indictment and punishment, a
human rights abuser might in fact dig in his heels and refuse to give up or
compromise. He might take further steps to destroy evidence and witnesses,
exacerbating the abuses the indictment was designed to deter."
Empirical literature on these questions is relatively rare. In one important
exception examining an array of post-conflict devices used in civil wars from
1989 through 2003, including international and domestic criminal trials,
amnesties, and truth commissions, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri show that
international prosecutions fail to deter human rights abuses, consolidate
democracy, or help build peace. 2 They highlight that the two largest criminal
courts, the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") and Rwanda have failed to deter subsequent atrocities locally or
globally, as witnessed by the ongoing genocide in Darfur, among other places. 13
Besides the substantive challenges the ICC faces by virtue of its appointed
task, it also faces generic challenges as a new institution. New institutions such
as the ICC are subject to great scrutiny, and need to establish their own
credibility to accomplish their assigned tasks. The challenge is similar to that
faced by other international tribunals as well as by national constitutional courts
exercising the power of judicial review. If a new institution is able to prove itself
useful to some constituency in its early years, it may draw new cases and
establish a reputation for quality. If, on the other hand, it disappoints, it may
9 Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian
Atrocities?, 84 Wash U L Q 777, 781 (2006). See also Mirjan Damaska, What Is the Point of
International CriminalJusfice?, 83 Chi Kent L Rev 329, 339 n 16 (2008), quoting Richard Goldstone,
Letter to the Editor Crime and Punishment in War, Wall St J A13 (July 7, 2000) (asserting that
deterrence is "hopelessly idealistic" in maintaining that international criminal justice serves an
effective deterrent purpose); Prosecutor v Tadic, Case Nos IT-94-1 -A and IT-94-1-Abis, 48 (ICTY
Jan 26, 2000) (finding that deterrence should not be given "undue prominence").
10 Mark A. Drumbl, Atroty, Punishment, and International Law 170-72 (Cambridge 2007); Tom J.
Farer, Restraining the Barbarians: Can International Criminal Law Hej?, 22 Hum Rts Q 90, 92, 98
(2000).
11 See note 9 and accompanying text.
12 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Pindple and Pragmatism in Strategies of
InternationalJusice, 28 Intl Security 5, 20 (2003/2004) ("Evidence from recent cases casts doubt on
the claims that international trials deter future atrocities, contribute to consolidating the rule of
law or democracy, or pave the way for peace.").
13 Id.
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become irrelevant and seek to develop new lines of business to ensure its
success.
In short, the stakes are high for the ICC at this juncture in its life. How it
handles the various challenges it faces will have ramifications beyond the
institution itself, and will reflect on the international criminal law project more
generally. It is in this context that the Bashir indictment arose.
III. THE BASHIR INDICTMENT
The indictment of President Bashir marks the first time the ICC has indicted
a sitting head of state, and raises interesting issues of immunity, jurisdiction, and
joint criminal responsibility that are beyond the scope of this brief comment."
Sudan is not a state party to the ICC, and is obligated to comply only by virtue
of the UN Security Council Resolution 1593, adopted under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, which referred the situation to the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor
("OTP")."5 As mentioned above, were it a signatory, the complementarity regime
would allow Sudan to escape prosecution by initiating a credible investigation or
prosecution into the allegations. To say that the current government of Sudan is
unlikely to prosecute Bashir, however, is an understatement of significant
proportions.
President Bashir is being charged with three counts of genocide for
encouraging actions intended to bring about the destruction of the Fur, Masalit,
and Zaghawa ethnic groups. He is being charged with five counts of crimes
against humanity for directing the killing, torture, and displacement of various
other ethnic groups. The state actions against these other ethnic groups were
deemed insufficient to constitute genocide. He is also charged with two counts
of war crimes for attacking civilians and pillaging towns.16
Bashir is being charged as an individual under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome
Statute, which, as the OTP's Application for Warrant of Arrest indicates,
criminalizes "indirect perpetration or perpetration by means."' 7 The prosecutor
asserts that the mobilization of the state apparatus constitutes evidence of a plan
by the president to destroy entire ethnic groups. Bashir's destructive intent is
further evidenced by the fact that the 2.7 million people who have been
14 Marko Milanovic, ICC Prosecutor Charges the President of Sudan With Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes in Da fur, 12 Am Socy Ind L Insights 15 (uly 28, 2008), available online at
<http://www.asil.org/insights080728.cfm> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Office of the Prosecutor, Summary of the Case: Prosecutor's Appicalion for Warrant ofArrest underAricle
58 against Omar Hasan Abmad Al Bashir (uly 14, 2008) 1, available online at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-Summary-20081704-ENG.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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displaced to camps are almost all members of those three groups and have
received no government assistance. The OTP asserts that these displacements
constitute genocide according to the Genocide Convention. 8
The OTP estimates that thirty-five thousand people have been killed
outright by the apparatus of the government of Sudan. The OTP further
estimates at least another hundred thousand have died of starvation in the
displacement camps in the desert.' 9 Rape is cited as an integral part of the plan
of destruction in these camps.2" Recognizing that governments have a sovereign
right to use force, the OTP declares that the destruction in Sudan cannot be
characterized as collateral damage of any legitimate military campaign.2'
Before the prosecutor initiated his case against President Bashir, in June
2008, the Security Council completed a mission to Africa during which it met
with President Bashir and his advisor. The Security Council members urged the
government of Sudan to cooperate with the ICC's investigations of Ahmad
Haran and Ali Kushayb, two officials previously indicted by the ICC. 22 Both the
president and his advisor stated that Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute
and that they had no intention of cooperating with the ICC. 23 This set up the
current clash of commitments.
IV. THREE COMMITMENT PROBLEMS
Every promise, in politics or markets, has value only if the promisee believes
that it will be kept.24 This is the generic problem of credibility. One way to make
promises credible is to ensure that the promisee will be paid in the event the
promisor violates the promise i.2 Another way is to impose costs on the promisor
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 International Criminal Court Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Presents Case against Sudanese President,
Hassan Abmad Al Bashir, For Genodde, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Dafur Ouly 14,
2008), available online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=406&1-en.html>
(visited Dec 5, 2008).
21 Office of the Prosecutor, Summary of the Case at 4 (cited in note 17).
22 See note 1.
23 United Nations, Report of the Securio Council Mission to Djibouti (on Somalia), the Sudan, Chad, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cdte d'Ivoire, 31 May to 10 June 2008, UN Doc S/2008/460, 60
(2008). In mid-October, Sudan arrested Kushayb and promised to try him locally. Jeffrey
Gettleman, Sudan Arrests Militia Chief Facing Trial, NY Times A9 (October 13, 2008).
24 Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gerner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 51 (Harvard
1998).
25 See Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance 377 (Oxford 1996) (A credible commitment is
"a contract in which a promisee is reliably compensated should the promisor prematurely
terminate or otherwise alter the agreement.").
Vol. 9 No. 2
The Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal Court Ginsburg
directly so as to disincentivize breach. A credible commitment device is one that
disincentivizes breach, making the promise more valuable to both promisor and
promisee at the outset.
26
This section describes the three commitment problems that the ICC regime
addresses. First, it considers the commitment by signatory governments to
prosecute violators of international criminal law. Second, it considers the inverse
problem, namely how to credibly promise not to prosecute in the event of an
amnesty. Third, it considers the need for credibility by the ICC itself.
A. GOVERNMENTAL COMMITMENT TO PROSECUTE (AND
BE PROSECUTED)?
In a recent paper, Beth Simmons and Allison Danner argue that the ICC
solves a commitment problem for state parties that are fighting civil wars and
insurgencies.27 By signing the Rome Statute, and making the government
potentially prosecutable for offenses, they argue that a state ties its hands in
terms of the tactics that can be used to fight rebels. If the government uses
illegal tactics, it will be subject to sanction by the ICC. This makes accession to
the ICC regime costly, and sends a signal to domestic opponents. The ICC
becomes a kind of international monitor of domestic behavior, a particularly
important function that would otherwise be difficult to obtain in the absence of
domestic accountability mechanisms.28
Although the ICC does involve commitment, Simmons and Danner's
analysis is incomplete at several key junctures. Their argument depends on a
number of assumptions. First, it assumes that signatory states cannot find ways
to avoid prosecution by the ICC. The complementarity regime seems to
undercut this assumption, as a state can simply announce investigations and
prosecutions of those responsible for abuses without actually convicting them.29
It is difficult to imagine a rebel group believing that the state's hands were really
tied under such a regime. Still, it would be up to the ICC's pretrial chamber to
26 See J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy 163 (Cambridge 1993)
(focusing on credibility problems of legislators).
27 Beth Simmons and Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court 3-4,
paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (Feb 1, 2008)
(forthcoming 2009), available online at <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p-mlaapa_
research-citation/2/5/2/6/2/pages252629/p25 2 6 2 9 -l.php> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
28 See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democrafy: Constitutions, Commitment and International Law, 38 NYU J
Ind L and Politics 707, 729-32 (2006).
29 Consider generally William Burke-White, Proactive Complementario: The International Criminal Court
and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 Harv Intl J 53 (2008).
Winter 2009
Chicago Journal of Internalional Law
verify that the prosecution was actually effective and sincere, and so there is
some marginal element of commitment embodied in accession to the regime.
Simmons and Danner predict, and present evidence finding, that the ICC
will be especially popular among rich peaceful countries and war-torn
autocracies without strong mechanisms of domestic accountability. The former
countries sign onto the ICC because it costs them nothing. The latter countries,
they believe, adopt the ICC for the purpose of making credible commitments.30
This finding, however, is consistent with another view of the commitments
actually being made. The governments in question may indeed be trying to make
a strong commitment to prosecute, without necessarily committing to being
prosecuted. Simmons and Danner point out that state capacity may be weak so
commitment to the ICC helps make it clear that state officials will be well
prosecuted. But this argument applies as well to the rebels, who will be subject
to the same prosecutorial regime either at the national or international level.
Signing onto the ICC seems to expand the prospective likelihood of the rebels
being prosecuted. In this sense, one can view the ICC as a device by weak states
to credibly commit to prosecutions. It will ensure prosecutions even if
subsequent political regimes are too corrupt or poor to carry them out locally.31
This effect is asymmetric vis-A-vis the potential prosecutions of
governmental officials that Simmons and Danner highlight. While it may seem
that signing up to the ICC expands the prospective likelihood of governmental
officials being prosecuted as well, the government holds the keys to
complementarity. The government can initiate prosecutions of its own
functionaries and avoid international prosecution. Thus the effective quality of
prosecution under the ICC regime is more likely to improve vis-A-vis rebels than
governmental officials. The reason states sign the Rome Statute may be to
ensure prosecution of their opponents, not themselves.
Ensuring that rebels will be prosecuted by international, as opposed to
domestic, prosecution agents may also be attractive given the costs involved.
War-torn autocracies tend to be poor, and so signing onto the ICC essentially
sloughs off the costs of prosecutions onto the international community. For
these reasons, I am somewhat skeptical of Simmons and Danner's interpretation
of the commitment problem, though they are surely right that there is a
commitment problem involved. The government is tying its own hands to
ensure that prosecutions will go forward, but it is not trying to tie its hands with
regard to tactics.
30 Simmons and Danner at 26 (cited in note 27).
31 Id at 15.
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B. GOVERNMENTAL COMMITMENT NOT TO PROSECUTE:
THE AMNESTY PROBLEM
This section focuses on the flipside of the commitment argument articulated
by Simmons and Danner. They emphasize the power of the ICC to allow states
to credibly commit to prosecute and be prosecuted.12 ICC signature, however,
begets another credible commitment problem for states, namely how to credibly
commit not to prosecute. In some cases, the fear of prosecution may keep
human rights abusers entrenched when they would otherwise be persuaded to
leave. By taking the power to give effective amnesties away from government,
we may in fact exacerbate some of the worst human rights abuses.
This old critique of the ICC seems borne out by recent events in Uganda
surrounding the Lord's Resistance Army ("LRA"), the pseudo-Christian
insurrection that has wreaked havoc in northern Uganda and the southern Sudan
for over twenty years. The LRA has engaged in a brutal campaign of kidnapping,
sexual abuse and enslavement, murder, and employment of child soldiers.33 In
2005, the ICC charged the LRA's leader, Joseph Kony and four senior
commanders, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Raska
Lukwiya, with crimes against humanity and war crimes.34 The arrest warrants
were issued in response to the request of the Ugandan government under Article
14 of the Rome Statute, which allows state parties to request a prosecution.
However, even before the warrants were issued, Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni asked the ICC to drop the charges. 35 The government has now
asserted that traditional justice will be an effective tool for dealing with most of
the crimes, with a special chamber in Uganda's High Court to be utilized for the
32 Id.
33 See generally Hema Chadani, Uganda: A Nation in Crisis, 37 Cal W Intl L J 277 (2007).
34 See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II: Warrant of Arrest
for Joseph Kony Issued on 8Juy 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005 (Sept 27, 2005), available online
at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-53_English.pdf> (visited Dec 5,
2008); Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II: Warrant ofArrestfor Raska Lukwya (July
8, 2005), available online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-
55_English.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008); Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I:
Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo (July 8, 2005), available online at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-56_English.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008); Office of the
Prosecutor, ICC, Pre-Thal Chamber II: Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005), available
online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-57-English.pdf> (visited Dec
5, 2008). Lukwiya and Otti have subsequently died. Trial Watch, Vincent Otti, available online at
<http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/vincent-otti_395.html> (visited Dec
5, 2008); Trial Watch, Raska gukwya, available online at <http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-
watch/proflle/db/facts//o20raska-lukwiya_396.html> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
3 Alex K. Kriksciun, Uganda's Response to International Criminal Court Arrest Warrants: A Misguided
Approach?, 16 Tulane J Intl & Comp L 213, 214 (2007).
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leaders of the LRA.36 Under the Rome Statute, however, there is no way for a
government to withdraw a request.37 Nor is it likely that local processes of
dispute resolution would satisfy the requirement under the complementarity
regime that effective local prosecution be pursued.38 The Kony arrest warrants
thus have created what many in Uganda believe to be a barrier to the conclusion
of a peace deal.39
The presence of the ICC thus makes the promise of an amnesty less
credible. Even if the government is sincere in promising an amnesty, the
operative decisions to prosecute are no longer under the direct control of the
government. This lack of control has the effect of increasing the reservation
price of a potential bargain between the government and resistance forces,
reducing the scope of a deal. A government that wants to make a decision to
forgive cannot do so, once it has signed the Rome Statute.
To be sure, the problem existed before the ICC was created, simply because
of the threat of prosecution in third countries. The Pinochet case, for example,
showed that the Chilean amnesty was good only within Chile, and indeed, the
amnesty was eventually overturned in the aftermath of the British cases.a0
Nevertheless, the issue of whether we are better off in any particular situation
with an amnesty or a prosecution is not clear, and likely to depend on local
rather than universal factors.
Oddly, the possibility of an amnesty depends on some probability of
prosecution. If there were no prosecutions, the offer of amnesty would have
little value. I am in no way trying to suggest that all prosecutions for war crimes
and genocide are problematic. Rather the question is who has the power to make
the decision. In a world with 194 sovereigns it may sometimes be preferable to
leave the decision to the local actor rather than require blanket prosecution in
every available case.
36 Might the Lord's Resisters Give Up?, Economist 59 (Mar 15, 2008).
37 The only exception is that Article 53 of the Rome Statute allows the prosecutor to inform the
pretrial chamber that a prosecution is not in the "interests of justice" and therefore should not go
forward. 37 ILM at 1029. In addition, Article 16 allows the Security Council to defer a
prosecution or an investigation for a renewable period of twelve months. Id at 1012.
38 See Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice, University of San Diego, The Relationship between
International Criminal Justice and Conflict Resolution: Focus on the International Criminal Court 3 (Dec 12-
13, 2005) available online at <http://peace.sandiego.edu/documents/reports/Conference
Reports/wpm/2005/Report.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008) (citingJustice Goldstone).
39 Chadani, 37 Cal W Int L J at 291-92 (cited in note 33) (quoting local commentators as asserting
the ICC had committed a "blunder").
40 Madeleine Davis, The Pinochet Case 24-25 (University of London Institute of Latin American
Studies 2003).
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This discussion is relevant to the Sudan case because there is some evidence
that the international community would like to make a deal with Bashir. In the
UN Security Council's most recent vote reauthorizing peacekeeping forces for
Darfur, the US abstained because of concerns that the British-drafted text was
seeking to undermine the ICC and signal a potential deal to Bashir.4 ' Such a deal,
like all deals, will require some credibility to secure, credibility that may be
difficult to obtain in the wake of the ineffective amnesty offered to Charles
Taylor of Liberia.42 The international community may wish to make a
commitment that it is now unable to make.
C. ICC COMMITMENT TO PROSECUTE
Much of the normative argument about the ICC involves, implicitly,
recognition that one or the other of these commitment frameworks should
dominate and guide the ICC in its decisionmaking. For proponents of ending
impunity, the ICC can best fulfill its moral and political function by prosecuting
rigorously and uniformly, without regard to the particular complexities of any
particular situation and whether or not it will make things worse. The ICC
should not be used as a political tool.43 For pragmatists, the ICC should pay
careful attention to the local political situation and consider whether or not its
intervention will lead to better consequentialist outcomes.
In light of these competing political imperatives, what should the ICC do?
Some have argued that the ICC should recognize that amnesties are sometimes
necessary and so should take pragmatic considerations into account.4 The ICC
Prosecutor says that he regularly obtains communications from states, non-
governmental organizations, and parties to various conflicts asking him to
refrain from initiating prosecutions so that a peace deal can be worked out."
Yet giving in to pleas for pragmatism invites moral hazard. Parties to
conflicts will engage in strategic negotiation, holding out the promise of a peace
deal to avoid prosecution. Once the ICC becomes involved in evaluating
41 Louis Charbonneau, UN Renews Security Coundl Mandate on Darfur, US Abstains, Mail & Guardian
Online (Aug 1, 2008), available online at <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-01-un-renews-
darfur-peacekeeping-mandate-us-abstains> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
42 Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace With Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative
Justice Mechanisms, 23 Conn J Ind L 209, 242 (2008). See also Leila Sadat, Exile, Amnesy and
International Law, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 955, 1031 (2006).
43 Sadat, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1034 (cited in note 42).
44 See generally Carsten Stahn, Complementariy, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some
Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J Ind Crim just 695 (2005) (discussing
how amnesties should be handled).
45 Remarks at the American Society for International Law Meeting 2008, 102 Am Soc Intl L
Proceedings (forthcoming 2008).
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individual circumstances, it may lose its own credibility as a prosecutorial body.
The ICC is hardly in a position to evaluate the various claims for deterrence,
peace, and amnesty, which require careful local assessments of the political
situation that a faraway court and prosecutor are hardly equipped to handle.
In light of these concerns, the ICC faces its own credibility problem: that of
a new court trying to ensure that it has a role to play. To avoid having to take on
considerations that it is poorly equipped to handle, the ICC has an incentive to
be firm and apply a clear rule of prosecuting all who fall within the ambit of the
statute, without regard to local politics. It needs to tie its own hands with regard
to future deals in order to have any impact at all. Thus, the prudent thing may be
the strategy that has been adopted by Ocampo: to ignore all pleas for
pragmatism and commit to prosecuting whenever the factual predicate for ICC
action can be met.
Indeed, if the deterrent effect of the ICC is unclear, it is also empirically
unclear that international prosecutions in fact disrupt the peace process. Many
diplomats opposed the indictment of Mr. Milosevic before the ICTY in 1999, as
a hindrance to peace negotiations. 46 Yet today there is peace-if not warmth-in
former Yugoslavia. When the Special Court for Sierra Leone issued its arrest
warrant for Liberian President Charles Taylor, analysts predicted grave
consequences.47 Yet the amnesty eventually given to Mr. Taylor by Liberia broke
down and today he sits in the dock at the ICC in the Hague.48
D. CONFLICT AMONG THE COMMITMENTS
We thus see three competing commitment problems. Weak states want to
commit to prosecution and so sign the Rome Statute. They can tie their hands
and limit their abilities to deliver amnesties. In light of this, it would be a failure
for the ICC, which no doubt has worse information on the prospects for local
peace, to choose to evaluate issues on a case-by-case basis and sometimes refrain
from prosecution. It is in the prosecutor's interest to adopt a stance of carrying
out all prosecutions, and to be unaffected by outside information on political
consequences. To do otherwise is to invite cheap talk about the prospects for
deals, which the prosecutor is in a poor position to evaluate. Further, if the
prosecutor backs down in one case, he will be expected to do so in every case.
Removing the warrant against Kony, for example, would ensure that the ICC
would become no more than a tool of political negotiation, a stick to be
46 Polgreen and Simons, The Pursuit ofJustice, NY Times at A7 (cited in note 1).
47 Id (quoting Kofi Annan's predictions of grave consequences).
48 See Sadat, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 955 (cited in note 42).
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balanced against carrots-hardly the dream of the founders. Ocampo has
forcefully eliminated that position.
The incentives of defendants, on the other hand, are to hold out. Knowing
that the prosecutor's best strategy is to ignore local calls for pragmatism, so
dramatically illustrated in the Uganda case, the defendant must assume that
prosecutions will go forward and hence will not surrender. The prosecutor's
commitment strategy means the defendants will not give up.
All of this comes to a head in the case of Sudan. Because Ocampo has issued
the indictment, with an arrest warrant likely to follow, and has already
demonstrated resolve not to back down in the Kony case, Bashir's ability to
travel has been effectively limited to nonsignatories and those signatories willing
to ignore their obligations to arrest him. One possible response may be
intensification of the conflict-precisely what locals on the ground fear.
4 9
Ocampo will either end up with a spectacular arrest-or renewed and
widespread criticism that the ICC has made life worse for the beleaguered
residents of Darfur. A middle ground would be ineffectuality, hardly a desirable
outcome for the ICC.
V. COURTS, COMPLIANCE, AND CRISIS
The above discussion illustrates an interesting theme from constitutional
studies, which bear some structural similarities to international law."° As in the
international sphere, a central issue for constitutional courts is how to generate
compliance with their decisions. Famously lacking the purse or the sword, courts
are able to generate compliance only by convincing others, either government
officials or the public, that their decisions are worth upholding.
Most courts build up reputations over time and serve the interests of
powerful actors in doing so. For example, the US Supreme Court did not
challenge major national policies for many decades after the establishment of
judicial review was announced in Marbuy v Madison."' Rather, the Court served
the national agenda in policing countervailing state laws. 2 Other courts have
played a relatively cautious role in building up the power of judicial review. 3
49 Polgreen and Simons, The Pursuit ofJusice, NY Times at A7 (cited in note 1).
s0 See generally Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Conslitutional
Law, Public Law, 122 Harv L Rev - (forthcoming May 2009) (manuscript on file with authors).
51 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52 See generally Robert McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (Chicago 4th ed 2005) (Sandy
Levinson, ed).
53 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democraies 104 (Cambridge 2003).
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They must be careful not to overreach, and to ensure that their decisions are
respected.
How can they do this? One recent line of argument has emphasized judges'
abilities to generate decisions that are self-enforcing, meaning that it is in the
interests of parties to comply with the decisions.5 4 Coordination problems-like
the paradigmatic example of the rules of the road-are those in which both
parties have an interest in finding a shared outcome, even when they may
disagree over which outcome is best. Because there is no "best" answer, conflict
can be resolved based on expectations as to what the other party's action is likely
to be. Third parties, such as courts, can help the parties choose among possible
outcomes by providing focal points. By signaling that one or the other party is
correct, the court can generate compliance even without external enforcement of
the decision, because the court will change parties' expectations of each others'
strategies. Of course, the court can only do so if the parties believe its decision is
a sound one, or at least believe it is one that other people will think is sound.
To be sure, the relevant "game" in our context of international criminal law
is more complex than simple dispute resolution, which has a possibility of self-
enforcing decisions. From the point of view of the defendant, surrender is
almost always a bad idea, and it will take more than coordination on a focal
point to induce submission to a court. In Martin Shapiro's classic framework for
understanding what courts do, the international criminal law project is more akin
to social control than to dispute resolution.5 Still, even in this context,
coordination is at work. Courts engaged in social control are able to do so only
because other state actors-police, prosecutors, prison officials-follow their
orders. The relevant actors must agree on whom to arrest, when to do so, and
how to punish them. The coordination game here is among enforcers, not a
dispute between the criminal and the state. The ICC, which has no police force
of its own, is thus directing its communication efforts at powerful states that
might enforce any arrest warrant as well as at Bashir.
In a recent contribution, David Law argues that courts can,
counterintuitively, enhance their power by making unpopular or risky
decisions-so long as the decisions generate compliance.56 The key is to think of
the court as interested in developing a reputation for generating effective focal
points, in the form of decisions that are complied with. As the court is
54 See generally Tom Ginsburg and Richard McAdams, An Expressive Theory of International
Adjudication, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev 1229 (2004).
55 Martin Shapiro, Courts 14 (Chicago 1981).
56 David Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 Georgetown L J - (forthcoming
2009) (August 9, 2008 draft at 62-64), available online at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.
cfm/SSRNID1214022_code383976.pdabstractid=l 112613&mirid=l > (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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successful in issuing such decisions, people will adjust their expectations of
others' responses to future decisions, generating a potential cascade of
compliance. Furthermore, from the perspective of an audience member
evaluating the probability of compliance in a future case, it is surely more
impressive that the court has generated compliance in an unpopular case than in a
popular one. A risky and unpopular decision actually shores up the court's long-
term reputation for generating focal points."
From this perspective, Ocampo's strategy may pay big dividends. If the ICC
can announce a high profile indictment and eventually issue an arrest warrant for
a sitting head of state who has promised to defy the ICC, and ( the ultimate
result is a trial for Bashir, the ICC will have established itself as a credible
institution. Other leaders will recognize that they are unlikely to be able to defy
the ICC, and may act differently in anticipation of potential prosecutions.
Importantly, states that have been marginal supporters of the ICC may come to
believe that other states support the ICC, and hence will seek to appear to
support it as well. This could lead them to avoid the embarrassment of, for
example, failing to arrest indictees who are within their jurisdictions, making the
overall enforcement regime more effective. The commitment to prosecute will
have trumped the impulse to amnesty.
Consider, however, the alternative result. If Bashir gets away with defying
the ICC, the ICC's reputation for providing focal points will lay in tatters. Other
parties, be they states considering volunteering enforcement resources for the
court, or potential defendants, will view the ICC as a paper tiger, whose
decisions do not produce action even among supporters of the ICC. This will
become a self-fulfilling cycle: all but the most ardent state supporters are likely to
condition their support on the expectation that others will also support the ICC.
Noncompliance indicates that no one takes the ICC seriously, leaving the few
ardent supporters to appear to be wasting resources.
Which result is more likely to obtain? Ocampo's efforts are even more of a
long shot than they appear. If Bashir ignores the international community, as
seems likely, the ICC may lose support. If Bashir does a deal with the Security
Council to end the genocide in return for some kind of amnesty or delay in the
prosecution, the ICC's credibility will also be harmed, as it will have undermined
its own commitment to prosecute.58 Future dictators will discount the threat of
prosecution. Only if the ICC succeeds in getting states with enforcement
57 Id.
58 Some evidence that the Security Council is interested in a deal can be seen in the reported French
overture to Bashir to block prosecution in exchange for concrete steps to stop the genocide and
to turn over the two previous indictees to the ICC. Gettleman, Sudan Arrests Militia Chief, NY
Times A9 (cited in note 23).
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capacity to coordinate on its favored outcome, namely the arrest and
prosecution of a sitting head of state, will its credibility be enhanced.
It seems likely that the judges of the ICC-who are its de facto managers-
are aware of the risks inherent in the prosecutor's strategy. This may be one
reason that they have delayed issuing the arrest warrant that was requested by
the prosecutor.59 As a young institution, the ICC cannot afford a spectacular
failure. By delaying, the judges allow for the possibility that Sudan's leader will
take steps to end the genocide, which might encourage the Security Council to
block the prosecution. But this is precisely the type of bargained solution that
the prosecutor seeks to avoid.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ICC has generated much fanfare-and criticism-since the adoption of
the Rome Statute in 1998. It has been variously portrayed as a harbinger of a
global era of non-impunity, an irrelevance, and a dangerous device that risks
undermining American sovereignty. Its performance so far has belied the most
extreme claims on either side: by design, the ICC is hardly positioned to pose a
risk to rich countries, but it is also unable to take on significant cases without
support from those same states.
One interpretation of the ICC, offered by Professors Simmons and Danner,
is that it is a body designed to resolve commitment problems.60 This
interpretation is certainly plausible, though this Article disagrees with their
characterization of the problem. But while the ICC resolves one set of
commitment problems, it exacerbates another, making commitments to amnesty
more difficult when it would be useful. It was inevitable that these two
competing commitment imperatives would clash as the ICC confronted its
mandate. That clash now seems to have emerged with the indictment of a sitting
head of state, President Bashir of Sudan, for war crimes and genocide.
The prosecutor has chosen a difficult case. The logic of coordination
suggests that it will lead to a spectacular success for the ICC or a spectacular
failure. A betting person would lean toward the latter at the moment. But only
time will tell.
59 Reuters, ICC Seeks More Informafion on Bashir Arrest Request (Oct 17, 2008), available online at
<http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnJOE49G3K.html> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
60 Consider generally Simmons and Danner, Credibk Commitments (cited in note 27).
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